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Introduction 
The State argues that Mr. Meinhard did not preserve his argument that a 
petitioner is entitled to DNA testing where the DNA testing is likely to lead to 
evidence that will exonerate the petitioner. But that is precisely the argument 
Mr. Meinhard advanced in the district court, numerous times. In the district 
court, the State argued that to be entitled to DNA testing, a petitioner must 
provide evidence that, coupled with only the DNA test results, will exonerate the 
petitioner. Mr. Meinhard argued that he need only show that the DNA testing is 
likely to lead to evidence that will exonerate. Mr. Meinhard preserved the issue. 
The State's response otherwise consists of pointing out that the DNA test 
results might not exonerate Mr. Meinhard, an obvious possibility in every testing 
case that the statute contemplates. The State asserts that perhaps Mr. Peterson 
did not fight his killer, or maybe the DNA under the fingernails belongs to 
someone with whom he had wrestled, or perhaps an "unwary hiker" left the 
fingerprint. While the DNA test results could lead to evidence consistent with 
the State's suppositions, the results also have the potential to lead to evidence 
that exonerates Mr. Meinhard. Mr. Meinhard is entitled to testing to find out. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that the State has always believed that the 
fingernail scrapings and the fingerprint might identify the killer. This is precisely 
the reason the State tested the evidence in 1997. And although the results back 
then were inconclusive, there have since been significant advances in DNA 
testing. In other words, testing can now provide the information the State sought 
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in 1997-the killer's identity. The results therefore have the potential to lead to 
evidence showing that someone other than Mr. Meinhard killed Mr. Peterson. 
Preliminary Matter 
Before addressing the merits of the State's response, it is worth dispelling 
an assertion that appears throughout the response brief. The State repeatedly 
characterizes the DNA testing under the DNA Testing Statute as "state-funded" 
testing. (Resp. Br. at 13,14,15,16,20,23,26,30,31,32,37.) There are two problems 
with the State's characterization of the payment mechanism. 
First, under the DNA Testing Statute, "state-funded" testing is the only 
type of post-conviction DNA testing an indigent petitioner may obtain. Utah 
Code§ 78B-9-301(7)(a), (8)(a), (9). The fact that the State must conduct and fund 
the testing is the legislature's doing-not Mr. Meinhard's. 
Second, the testing is "state-funded" only if the results are favorable to the 
petitioner. Id. § 78B-9-301(9). If the results are unfavorable, "the court may order 
the person to reimburse the state for the costs of the testing." Id.§§ 78B-9-301(9), 
-304(1)(b). Thus, the State must fund only those DNA tests that support ~ 
exoneration, which is hardly an unjust result. While the State's view of the 
funding mechanism is beside the point, it is worth clarifying how the funding 
mechanism works. 
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Argument 
In addressing the merits, the State adds to the statutory prerequisites for 
DNA testing. The State contends that, in addition to the requirements articulated 
in the statute, a petitioner must show how the DNA test results will be the 
lynchpin that proves the remainder of his case-a feat that is nearly impossible 
for a petitioner who cannot predict whose DNA will be revealed in the test. 
Below, Mr. Meinhard shows how the State's interpretation is unsupported by-
and inconsistent with- the DNA Testing Statute and the PCRA. In fact, the DNA 
Testing Statute permits testing when the results alone may not exonerate. 
What a petitioner must show is the potential utility of the test results. 
Here, Mr. Meinhard made that showing by pointing out the serious problems 
with the circumstantial evidence upon which the conviction was based. The 
conviction was based primarily upon the testimony of Mr. Taylor, the only 
witness who purported to describe the logistics of the murder. 
In the opening brief, Mr. Meinhard pointed out several problems with 
Mr. Taylor's story, the most troubling of which is that it leaves unexplained how 
Mr. Peterson's body ended up outside of-and several miles away from-his car. 
In the response brief, the State does not acknowledge these problems, let alone 
address them, primarily because the response was drafted before this appeal.1 
1 The State's discussion of the evidence of Mr. Meinhard's guilt is nearly 
identical to the discussion it provided in its opposition to Mr. Meinhard's 
petition. (Compare Resp. Br. at 48-61, with R.233-46.) This explains why the State's 
response brief fails to address Mr. Taylor's strong motive and the other 
evidentiary problems Mr. Meinhard raised in his opening brief. (Op. Br. at 45-47.) 
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As discussed below, because the DNA test results can lead to new 
evidence that will explain the evidence at trial and exonerate Mr. Meinhard, the 
statute permits testing. But first, Mr. Meinhard shows that he preserved this 
argument. 
I. Mr. Meinhard Preserved His Argument that the DNA Testing Statute 
Permits Testing When the Results Can Lead to Exonerating Evidence 
Mr. Meinhard's interpretation of the DNA Testing Statute has remained 
consistent throughout this case. In his petition, Mr. Meinhard argued that he is 
entitled to DNA testing because the results had the potential to produce 
exonerating evidence. (R.26.) The State opposed the petition, arguing that the 
DNA Testing Statute permits testing only where the test results will, by 
themselves, exonerate the petitioner. (Op. Br. Addendum Cat R.222-23,239-43.) 
In his reply memorandum, Mr. Me:inhard noted that the State's position 
"conflates two different proceedings" -the DNA testing stage and the relief 
stage. (R.292, attached at Addendum F.) Mr. Me:inhard explained that the DNA 
Testing Statute provides a "low threshold" for obtaining testing "because a 
petition for DNA testing simply seeks to gather potentially exonerating 
information, not to conclusively establish factual innocence." (R.292.) He 
explained that only at the relief stage must a petitioner "satisfy the heightened 
standard of actually showing factual innocence by 'clear and convincing 
evidence."' (R.292.) In other words, the PCRA contemplates that, at the relief 
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stage, the petitioner presents evidence that he did not have when he requested 
DNA testing. In support, Mr. Meinhard cited the DNA Testing Statute. (R.292.) 
Similarly, at the hearing, counsel for Mr. Meinhard elaborated on the 
different possible outcomes of the DNA test results and how testing in this case 
might spark an investigation and identify the killer: 
Should there be foreign DNA under the victim's fingernails, if it 
belongs to Mr. Meinhard, this case is absolutely over and we don't 
go any further. If it belongs to Mr. Taylor who testified he was not 
present, that he had nothing to do with the crime, that certainly 
leads to some questions about the finding in the original trial. If it's 
the DNA of one of the other alternative suspects, the same is true. If 
it's a third-party DNA ... that can be matched to someone in the 
CODA system, that indeed may provide proof. 
(R.449:19.) 
The district court rejected Mr. Meinhard' s argument, agreeing instead with 
the State that the DNA Testing Statute permits testing only where the test results 
can, by themselves, exonerate the petitioner. (Op. Br. Addendum E at R.403-
04,421-25.) The court ruled that" the statute is specific in its requirement that it is 
the DNA evidence-not the DNA evidence plus other new evidence-that must 
prove the Petitioner's factual innocence." (Op. Br. Addendum Eat R.404.) 
On appeal, Mr. Meinhard repeated his argument. He acknowledged that, 
in some cases, "the nature of the crime is such that the DNA test results, by 
themselves, will demonstrate that the petitioner is factually innocent." (Op. Br. at 
26.) But he explained that testing is also appropriate "when it is possible that 
testing the DNA may lead to evidence, not presented at trial, that will exonerate 
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the petitioner." (Op. Br. at 32.) In other words, testing is available under the 
statute even when the results, by themselves, will not exonerate the petitioner 
without more evidence. (Op. Br. at 30.) In support, he cited the DNA Testing 
Statute and the factual innocence statute, section 78B-9-402. (Op. Br. at 26-35.) 
In its response brief, the State refers to this argument as the" discovery-tool 
consh·uction" of the DNA Testing Statute and asserts that Mr. Meinhard did not 
preserve it. (Resp. Br. at 15-19.) The State notes that, in the district court, 
Mr. Meinhard cited the DNA Testing Statute but not the factual innocence 
statute. (Resp. Br. at 17.) From this observation, the State argues that 
Mr. Meinhard "never suggested that testing under the DNA statute is required 
whenever the results could seed a later investigation into other evidence that he 
would eventually present in a subsequent innocence petition." (Resp. Br. at 17.) 
But that was precisely Mr. Meinhard's argument all along. On appeal, 
Mr. Meinhard has provided additional statutory support-the factual innocence 
statute. This is not a 0 preservation failure." (Resp. Br. at 19.) As this court has 
explained, "[a] litigant has no obligation to 'preserve' his citation to legal 
authority. If the foundation of a claim or argument is presented in a manner that 
allows the district court to rule on it," the appellant uis free to marshal any legal 
authority that may be relevant to its consideration on appeal." Torian v. Craig, 
2012 UT 63, ,r 20,289 P.3d 479. Mr. Meinhard presented his so-called 11discovery-
tool construction" of the DNA Testing Statute to the district court in a manner 
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that allowed the court to rule on it, and in fact, the court did rule on it. There is 
no preservation problem here. 
II. The State's Interpretation Contradicts the Statutory Language and the 
Legislative History 
The State argues that a petitioner may not obtain DNA testing unless he 
has shown that the results alone will establish his innocence. The State's 
argument is based upon section 78B-9-303, which permits a petitioner to file a 
motion to vacate his conviction if the DNA test results are "favorable" to him. 
Under subsection (2)(b), a court must vacate the conviction if "the DNA test result 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the person is factually 
innocent." Utah Code§ 78B-9-303(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
Based upon that language, the State concludes that a petitioner may obtain 
testing only if the results have the potential to demonstrate factual innocence. 
(Resp. Br. at 22-23,26,27.) As the State puts it, because u[t]he DNA test result is 
the only new, noncumulative evidence of innocence the court can consider in 
granting relief, ... the test result is a fortiori the only new, noncumulative 
evidence of innocence the court can consider in granting the state-funded testing 
in the first place." (Resp. Br. at 23.) As discussed below, there are five problems 
with the State's position. 
The (l)(b) Hearing- First, the State's reading renders superfluous the 
hearing contemplated by subsection (l)(b) of section 78B-9-303. That subsection 
describes the two options available to the State when a petitioner has moved to 
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vacate his conviction after receiving "favorable" DNA test results. Specifically, 
the State may either "stipulate to the conviction being vacated," or it "may 
request a hearing and attempt to demonstrate through evidence and argument 
that, despite the DNA test results, the state possesses sufficient evidence of the 
person's guilt so that the person is unable to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person is factually iimocent." Utah Code 
§ 78B-9-303(1)(b). 
Under the statute, the (l)(b) hearing is the time for the parties to present 
evidence concerning-and for the court to decide-whether the DNA test results 
exonerate the petitioner. This debate happens after the DNA testing is conducted, 
not before as the State contends. 
The State's reading eliminates any need for the subsequent hearing. 
According to the State, for a petitioner to obtain test results, the petitioner must 
already have proven, as a prerequisite to testing, that favorable test results will 
exonerate him. But if the petitioner has already proven that the test results can 
exonerate him, the State could never argue later at a (l)(b) hearing that" despite 
the DNA test results, the state possesses sufficient evidence of the person's guilt 
so that the person is unable to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the person is factually innocent." Id. Put simply, the State's reading leaves 
nothing to debate at the (l)(b) hearing, and no room to present new evidence 
there. The court already would have decided the question. 
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The State's brief illustrates the problem. Indeed, in various attempts to 
show how the DNA test results might not lead to evidence that will exonerate 
Mr. Meinhard, the State provides many arguments that it should make at a (l)(b) 
hearing, only after Mr. Meinhard receives favorable results. 
With respect to the fingernail scrapings, the State argues that because 
Mr. Peterson did not necessarily scratch his attacker, the killer's DNA will not 
necessarily be found under his fingernails. (Resp. Br. at 56.) Alternatively, the 
State argues that DNA under Mr. Peterson's fingernails "could have become 
lodged [there] ... in any number of ways, such as during a sporting event or 
sexual contact." (Resp. Br. at 57.) As for the fingerprint, the State suggests that it 
could have been left by "an unwary hiker." (Resp. Br. at 60.) The State also 
describes the various circumstantial evidence it presented at trial, arguing that it 
proves Mr. Meinhard's guilt. (Resp. Br. at 48-52.) And contrary to the story it 
presented at trial, the State theorizes that even if Mr. Meinhard did not kill 
Mr. Peterson, he must have been the getaway driver and was thus" present at the 
murder" and "'not innocent." (Resp. Br. at 62-63.) 
In other words, the State "attempt[s] to demonstrate through evidence and 
argument that, despite the DNA test results, the state possesses sufficient 
. evidence of [Mr. Meinhard's] guilt so that [he] is unable to demonstrate that he is 
factually innocent." Utah Code§ 78B-9-303(1)(b). These are precisely the 
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arguments that the statute contemplates will be provided at a (l)(b) hearing after 
the DNA tests have been conducted. Not before. 
Similarly, the statute provides that, at the hearing, the court will consider 
"all the ~vidence presented at the original trial," along with evidence presented 
"at the hearing under Subsection l(b), including the new DNA test result." Id. 
§ 78B-9-303(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). This means the (l)(b) hearing provides an 
opportunity for both sides to present evidence- beyond the test result- that was 
not presented at trial. The test results are only part of the evidence the court must 
consider in determining whether the petitioner is factually innocent. In other 
words, the test results need not alone establish the petitioner's innocence. And 
this is true even when the DNA Testing Statute is read in isolation.2 
The State's reading denies both parties the opportunity to present evidence 
in response to the test results. Indeed, the State contends that, uunder the DNA 
statute's remedy provisions, the court can consider no other kind of 'new, 
noncumulative evidence' beside the DNA test result." (Resp. Br. at 22.) This 
reading conflicts directly with the statute. 
Investigation Based Upon the Results - The second problem with the 
State's reading is that it denies both parties the opportunity to conduct an 
investigation based upon the DNA test results. This is true because the State 
2 Mr. Meinhard' s interpretation of the DNA Testing Statute does not depend 
upon the factual innocence statute as the State contends. (Resp. Br. at 24.) 
Reading the statutes in harmony, however, supports and strengthens 
Mr. Meinhard's interpretation. See infra pp. 12-14. 
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contends that the court's innocence determination takes place prior to testing. 
Critically, the State's reading provides no opporhmity for either party to present 
evidence concerning the significance of the test results. 
According to the State, a petitioner and the State must present all of their 
arguments-including their explanations concerning the significance of the test 
results- before the tests may be conducted. But as discussed above, the statute 
permits the court to consider new evidence at the (l)(b) hearing. Utah Code 
§ 78B-9-303(2)(a)(i). Thus, according to the State, the parties must present this 
new evidence in the petition for DNA testing. 
In other words, under the State's reading, in order to get testing, the 
petitioner must predict whose DNA may be identified by the tests, investigate 
those people, and in the petition present evidence and arguments showing that a 
particular test result will clearly and convincingly exonerate the petitioner. 
Similarly, the State must also predict the possible DNA test resu.lts, conduct 
similar investigations, and present the court with evidence and arguments 
showing that none of those results would undermine the conviction. 
According to the State, this is true regardless of whether the petitioner 
ultimately files a motion to vacate the petition under section 78B-9-303, or a 
petition to determine factual innocence under section 78B-9-402. (Resp. Br. at 30.) 
Indeed, the State contends that a petitioner who seeks DNA testing in support of 
a petition to determine factual innocence may do so only after he has "ma[ d]e a 
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complete proffer under the factual innocence statute, and a DNA test remains the 
only piece missing from the innocence puzzle." (Resp. Br. at 30.) 
But aside from contradicting the statutory language, the State's position is 
impractical. In some cases, the petitioner may be able to narrow the list of people 
who could have committed the crime, thoroughly investigate them, and provide 
in his petition all of the evidence showing his innocence. But in other cases, such 
as random crimes, the petitioner has no way to identify the perpetrator, and he 
will have no way to investigate the correct person. 
The State's brief illustrates the problem. As discussed above, the State 
hypothesizes various explanations for why DNA from various people may or 
may not be found in this case. But without the actual results, both the State and 
Mr. Meinhard are denied the opportunity to investigate the results and provide a 
coherent theory that supports Mr. Meinhard's guilt or innocence. This is 
precisely why the statute contemplates that, after obtaining DNA testing, the 
parties will have an opportunity to identify and present new evidence based 
upon the results. 
The Factual Innocence Statute -The third problem with the State's 
interpretation is that it contradicts the factual innocence statute. The factual 
innocence statute permits a petitioner to file a petition for determination of 
factual innocence based upon "newly discovered material evidence ... that, if 
credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent." Utah Code 
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§ 78B-9-402(1), (2)(i). And the statute provides that "[i]f some or all of the evidence 
alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence subject to DNA testing, the 
petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to [the DNA Testing Statute]." Id. 
§ 78B-9-402(6) (emphasis added). In other words, the statute contemplates that a 
post-conviction DNA test can provide part of the new evidence that establishes 
the petitioner's factual innocence. But as discussed above, this is contrary to the 
State's theory that a petitioner may obtain DNA testing only if he first proves 
that the results can alone exonerate him. 
The State provides two responses. First, the State inconsistently claims 
that, under the factual innocence statute, a petitioner can seek DNA testing on 
evidence that will not alone establish innocence, but only if he first proves that a 
favorable DNA test result will, by itself, establish innocence. As the State puts it, 
"a petitioner would first file a factual innocence petition, proffering all of the 
evidence required under that statute to show factual innocence .... Once a 
petitioner makes a complete proffer under the factual innocence statute, and a 
DNA test remains the only piece missing from the innocence puzzle, then he 
would file a petition under the DNA statute." (Resp. Br. at 30.) 
This reading conflicts with the statute's requirements governing factual 
innocence petitions. The statute requires the petitioner to identify the "specific 
evidence" that establishes innocence. Utah Code§ 78B-9-402(2)(a)(ii). But in the 
State's view, the petitioner must file the petition before he obtains DNA testing, 
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receives the results, or discovers the new evidence the results will uncover. A 
petitioner could therefore never identify in the petition the II specific evidence" 
that establishes innocence. 
Alternatively, the State claims that the factual innocence statute has no 
bearing on the interpretation of the DNA Testing Statute because the factual 
innocence statute was enacted years later. (Resp. Br. at 25.) But it is well-settled 
that II statutes should be construed so that no part or provision will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not 
destroy another." State v. J.M.S. (In re J.M.S.), 2011 UT 75, ,r 22,280 P.3d 410 
(alterations omitted). Thus, this court "interpret[s] the provisions of a statute in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Id. 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). This is true regardless of when 
the various provisions were enacted. Indeed, there is no support for the State's 
proposition that a statute should be read in harmony only with the statutes that 
existed at the time it was enacted. (Resp. Br. at 25.) 
In this case, the factual innocence statute expressly contemplates that DNA G., 
test results may be only part of the evidence that exonerates a petitioner. Reading 
the factual innocence statute in harmony with the DNA Testing Statute therefore 
supports the conclusion that a petitioner may obtain DNA testing even when the 
results alone may not exonerate him. 
14 
J.IPotential to Produce" - The fourth problem with the State's reading is 
that it gives no meaning to much of the statutory text, including the word 
11 produce." The DNA Testing Statute permits testing when the petitioner 
11 
alleges," among other things, that II the evidence that is the subject of the request 
for testing has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that will 
establish the person's factual innocence." Utah Code§ 78B-9-301(2)(f) (emphasis 
added). But the State's reading omits the italicized language. In the State's view, 
the statute permits testing only when II the evidence that is the subject of the 
request for testing has the potential to establish the person's factual innocence." 
With the relevant language omitted, the State contends that the DNA 
Testing Statute "fits comfortably among the strictest statutes" governing DNA 
testing across the country. (Resp. Br. at 37.) Under the State's altered version of 
the statute, testing is permitted only where "the evidence logically requires the 
presence of only the [perpetrator's] DNA, excluding all others." (Resp. Br. at 57-
58.) Indeed, were the State correct that Utah's statute required that "the evidence 
that is the subject of the request for testing will establish the person's factual 
innocence," the State also would be correct that the statute does not permit 
testing if "there is no possible combination of DNA results that has the potential 
to exclude Mr. Meinhard as the killer." (R.44~:13.) 
And ignoring the relevant language, Utah's statute would be similar to 
Pennsylvania's, which requires a petitioner to establish that "DNA testing of the 
15 
specific evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish ... actual 
innocence." 42 Pa. Const. Stat. § 9543.l(c)(3)(ii)(A). But as for the rest of the 
statutes the State cites as being the "strictest," nearly all of them actually permit 
testing when the test results "may'' exonerate the petitioner, "produce" 
exculpatory evidence, or -when the results would be "material" to the identity of 
the perpetrator. (Resp. Br. at 35 n.10.) In other words, like Utah's statute, those 
11 strict" statutes do not require that the test results, by themselves, exonerate the 
petitioner. 3 
3 Alaska Stat. § 12. 73.020(7) (requiring testing if the petitioner "identifies a 
theory of defense that would establish the [petitioner's] innocence"); Idaho Code 
§ 19-4902(e)(l) ("[t]he trial court shall allow the testing" if "[t]he result of the 
testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent"); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, § 7(b)(4) (requiring the trial court to allow testing if 
the petitioner has "demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence ... that the 
requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is material to the 
[petitioner's] identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case"); Mich. Comp. Laws§ 770.16(4)(a) ("[t]he court shall order DNA testing 
if ... the evidence sought to be tested is material to the issue of the convicted 
person's identity as the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime that resulted 
in the conviction"); N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 651-D:2(III)(d) (permitting testing if the 
"DNA results of the evidence sought to be tested would be material to the issue Cw 
of the petitioner's identity as the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime that 
resulted in his or her conviction or sentence"); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.692(2)( d) 
(requiring testing where "[t]here is a reasonable possibility that the testing will 
produce exculpatory evidence that would establish the innocence of the 
person"); S.D. Codified Laws§ 23-5B-1(9)(b) (requiring testing where "[t]he 
petitioner identifies a theory of defense that ... [w]ould establish the actual 
innocence of the petitioner''); Va. Code§ 19.2-327.l(A)(iii) (permitting testing 
where "the testing is materially relevant, noncumulative, and necessary and may 
prove the actual innocence of the convicted person"); Wyo. Stat.§ 7-12-303(c)(ix) 
(permitting testing where "the evidence that is the subject of the request for 
testing has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that will 
establish the rnovant' s actual innocence"). 
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But when meaning is given to all of the statutory language-as it must 
be- the State's interpretation fails. The test results need not be able to "prove" 
the petitioner's innocence as the State contends, but need only lead to or 
"produce" evidence that might. And the results need not be guaranteed-the 
statute requires only that there be a "potential" that the results will produce 
exculpatory evidence. When 1neaning is given to all the language, the statute 
permits testing where, like here, the test results might lead to evidence that can 
exonerate the petitioner. 
Legislative Intent-The fifth problem with the State's reading, assuming 
the State has shown that language to be ambiguous, is that it contradicts the 
legislative history. The legislature did not intend that DNA testing would be 
available only when" the evidence logically requires the presence of only the 
[perpetrator's] DNA, excluding all others," as the State contends. (Resp. Br. at 57-
58.) Instead, the legislature intended testing to be available when the results 
could show the absence of the petitioner's DNA, or, in other words, the 
petitioner was not the "person there" at the scene of the crime. Floor Debate, Feb. 
16 (statement of Sen. Hillyard). (A transcript of the floor debates is attached at 
Addendum G). 
Specifically, Senator Hillyard explained that "the science of DNA testing 
has so progressed to the point that you can go back and take [a] DNA sample 
and test it to see whether [it] really belongs" to the person convicted for the 
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crime. Floor Debate, Feb. 19 (statement of Sen. Hillyard). He cited an example of 
a Virginia case where, after obtaining post-conviction DNA testing, a 1nan on 
death row was exonerated "within 8 days of being executed" because, with the 
test results, he was "able to establish that he was not the person there." Floor 
Debate, Feb. 16 (statement of Sen. Hillyard). He also explained that, under the 
DNA Testing Statute, a petitioner would be entitled to a hearing uif [the test 
result] comes back to show that [he is] not the person with that DNA." Id. In 
short, the legislature suggested that testing would be available to show the 
absence of the petitioner's DNA-not only when testing could definitively prove 
innocence. This contradicts the State's reading. 
Similarly, the legislature did not intend that a petitioner would be required 
to "make a complete proffer under the factual innocence statute," and obtain 
testing only if "a DNA test remains the only piece missing from the innocence 
puzzle." (Resp. Br. at 30.) Instead, the legislature made testing available where, 
like here, the test results might lead to evidence that can exonerate the petitioner. 
III. DNA on the Fingernail Clippings and on the Fingerprint Can Produce 
Evidence that Will Establish Mr. Meinhard's Factual Innocence 
In the remainder of its brief, the State argues that the biological evidence 
cannot produce new evidence that will establish Mr. Meinhard' s innocence. 
(Resp. Br. at 40-65.) But as discussed below, because many of the State's 
arguments were not drafted in response to the opening brief, the State largely 
fails to respond to the arguments Mr. Meinhard made in his opening brief. 
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Before responding to the State's arguments, Mr. Meinhard first discusses these 
problems. 
A. The State's Brief Does Not Address the Opening Brief Because the 
State Drafted Its Fact Section Before the Appeal 
In the State's discussion of the biological evidence, the State 
mischaracterizes Mr. Meinhard's arguments and fails to respond to the 
evidentiary issues Mr. Meinhard raised in his opening brief. This problem is 
explained, in part, by the fact that approximately half of this portion of the State's 
brief is copied, nearly verbatim, from its opposition to Mr. Meinhard' s petition 
below. (Compare Resp. Br. at 48-61, with R.233-46.) 
The most egregious mischaracterization occurs when the State claims that 
Mr. Meinhard "has provided no theory explaining how the totality of th[ e] 
evidence is in any way consistent with the guilt of another person." (Resp. Br. at 
50; see also R.236 ("he has not provided any theory explaining how the totality of 
th[e] evidence is in any way consistent with the guilt of another person"). But as 
Mr. Meinhard explained, if the DNA test results "identify Mr. Taylor's DNA, that 
result alone could be enough to exonerate Mr. Meinhard as it would undermine 
Mr. Taylor's testimony and implicate him as the real killer." (Op. Br. at 50-51.) 
Indeed, Mr. Meinhard thoroughly explained how the evidence showed 
that Mr. Taylor could be the killer. (Op. Br. at 43-48.) Mr. Taylor had a strong 
motive to kill Mr. Peterson, and there were several troubling aspects of his 
testimony. Specifically, in the opening brief, Mr. Meinhard explained that 
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(i) Mr. Taylor said that Mr. Meinhard dragged a body across the front console of 
a car, a feat nearly impossible for a man in Mr. Meinhard's physical condition; 
(ii) Mr. Taylor claims that he never saw Mr. Peterson's body, even though he was 
twice only inches from the car where, he says, Mr. Peterson's body was in the 
passenger seat; and, most important, (iii) according to Mr. Taylor's story, it was 
impossible that Mr. Peterson's body ended up where it was found, miles from 
Mr. Peterson's car. (Op. Br. at 45-46.) The State provides no response to these 
troubling aspects of Mr. Taylor's testimony and in fact, seems to ignore them. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Meinhard also pointed out that, according to 
Mr. Taylor, Mr. Meinhard never took the body out of the car, making his story 
incompatible with the physical evidence. (Op. Br. at 46-47.) But the State fails to 
acknowledge this problem, and instead repeats what it stated to the district 
court: "Meinhard dragged Peterson's body out of the passenger side of the car 
and up a dirt trail leading into the hills." (Resp. Br. at 6; R.215 ("Petitioner 
dragged Peterson's body out of the passenger side of the car and up a dirt trail 
leading into the hills.") As Mr. Meinhard explained in his opening brief, 
Mr. Taylor's testimony does not support this conclusion. (Op. Br. at 46-47.) 
Next, with respect to Mr. Meinhard's physical condition at the time of the 
murder, Mr. Meinhard explained in his opening brief that it would have been 
"near impossible for a person in Mr. Meinhard's condition" to "stab[] 
Mr. Peterson to death, and then drag[] the body over the console to the passenger 
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seat." (Op. Br. at 45.) Mr. Meinhard explained that this is true because 
Mr. Meinhard' s "left arm was in a sling and so weak that he sometimes had to 
move it with his right arm, ... [h ]is leg was held together with pins and rods, 
and he could not bend his ankle." (Id. (citations omitted).) In short, 
uMr. Meinhard could not have moved a body by himself." (Id.) 
But in response, the State again fails to acknowledge the problem and 
copies verbatim what it stated below: "Meinhard fails to acknowledge that the 
killer used his right arm to stab Peterson, not his left. Meinhard also fails to 
acknowledge that he had almost full use of his right arm by the time of the 
murder." (Resp. Br. at 51 (citation omitted); R.237.) The fact that Mr. Meinhard 
may have been able to use his right arm does not explain how he could - with a 
severely injured left arm and leg-have dragged a body by himself. 
Further, the State accuses Mr. Meinhard of "fail[ing] to acknowledge that 
his disabilities in part established that it was Meinhard who wiped the car down 
after the murder" -specifically, the prints in the snow around the car. (Resp. Br. 
at 52.) This accusation is confusing in light of Mr. Meinhard's explanation of how 
the State believed the prints in the snow implicated him in the murder: 
First, the State argued that the footprints in the snow around 
Mr. Peterson's car implicated Mr. Meinhard because they were large 
like Mr. Meinhard's feet, they looked "just like" the abnormal gait 
caused by his external fixator, and the tread pattern ''matched" the 
pattern on his shoes. 
Second, the State pointed to the imprints of the "object" that had 
been set down in the snow and argued that "[i]t's very likely that the 
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bleach odor, after he had splashed it around, was making his asthma 
act up, and he had to stop" -twice, setting the bleach down both 
times-" to give himself a shot of medicine because of the asthma." 
(Op. Br. at 15 (citations omitted)). It is unclear how Mr. Meinhard could have 
better "acknowledge[d]" this circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the State's 
accusation is another passage largely copied from its opposition memorandum 
filed below, not drafted in response to the opening brief. (R.237.) 
Similarly, Mr. Meinhard emphasized in his brief that the oral pain 
medication found near Mr. Peterson's car was a different brand from the 
medication later found in Mr. Meinhard' s possession. (Op. Br. at 15.) But in 
response, the State again repeats verbatim what it stated below: "Police found 
toothache drops and a box for toothache drops in very close proximity to the 
car," and 11 [t]his was the same brand of toothache drops found on Meinhard." 
(Resp. Br. at 49 (citation omitted); R.233-34.) This statement contradicts the 
evidence presented at trial. (C.R.753:11-12,91 (police found Dents brand 
toothache medicine at the scene, but found Orajel on Mr. Meinhard)). In fact, it 
also contradicts the State's closing argument at trial: "The defendant ... had a 
new toothache medicine now. Now it was Orajel and not the Dents" which was 
found at the scene. (C.R.757:49.) 
Ultimately, the fact that much of the State's brief is copied from its petition 
explains why it fails to respond to many of the points in Mr. Meinhard' s brief. 
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B. The Fingernail Clippings Can Produce Evidence that Will 
Exonerate Mr. Meinhard 
Mr. Meinhard argued that DNA on Mr. Peterson's fingernail clippings 
could identify his killer. (Op. Br. at 48.) In support, Mr. Me:inhard noted that the 
evidence indicates that Mr. Peterson fought his attacker before his death. (Id.) 
Specifically, the medical examiner identified defensive wounds on Mr. Peterson's 
body and noted that they were indicative of a "violent struggle," and 
Mr. Peterson's fingernails were covered in a reddish-brown substance consistent 
with blood. (Id.) Because Mr. Peterson struggled with his attacker, the blood 
under his fingernails could belong to his attacker. (Id. at 48-49.) 
Mr. Meinhard also noted that the medical examiner found hairs on 
Mr. Peterson's hands, and that even though the hairs are not available for testing, 
they "further support the medical examiner's theory that Mr. Peterson fought his 
attacker." (Id. at 49.) In response, the State argues that Mr. Meinhard's theory 
"turns on whether hair was recovered from Peterson's hands." (Resp. Br. at 46.) 
From there, the State concludes that, because "four separate courts rejected 
Meinhard's claim that hairs were found in Peterson's hand," Mr. Meinhard's 
argument fails. (Id. at 45-46.) 
But Mr. Meinhard' s theory does not depend upon there having been hairs 
in Mr. Peterson's hands. Instead, his theory depends upon the blood under 
Mr. Peterson's fingernails, along with the medical examiner's observation that 
Mr. Peterson engaged in a "violent struggle" with his attacker. (Op. Br. at 48.) 
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Together, this evidence suggests that Mr. Peterson fought his attacker, and, 
therefore, the killer's DNA may be under his fingernails. As Mr. Meinhard 
explained, the fact that the medical examiner found what he believed were hairs 
in Mr. Peterson's hands is "further support" for that theory. (Op. Br. at 49.) 
Similarly, at the hearing on Mr. Meinhard's petition, the State conceded 
that "there is a potential that [Mr. Peterson] scratched the attacker." (R.449:16.) In 
other words, there is a "potential" that the fingernail clippings can lead to the 
identification of Mr. Peterson's killer and produce evidence that exonerates 
Mr. Meinhard. That alone satisfies the DNA Testing Statute. 
The State agreed in 1997 when it tested the fingernail clippings "to 
determine whether there is skin or blood from the perpetrator under the 
fingernails." (C.R.148,284.) The State now contends that it can be "excused" for 
what it calls an "early misconception that the fingernails might have evidentiary 
import." (Resp. Br. at 59.) But the potential" evidentiary import" of the fingernail 
clippings is the same today as it was in 1997. Testing may lead to the identity of 
the killer. That is precisely why the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure required Q 
the State to test them in the first place. (See Resp. Br. at 58-59.) And nothing in the 
record suggests that the State's stipulation was based upon the "misconception 
... that investigators found hairs in Peterson's hands." (Id.) 
Further, no court has ever "rejected [Mr.] Meinhard's claim that hairs were 
found in [Mr.] Peterson's hand" as the State contends. (Resp. Br. at45.) The 
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question before the courts was whether the State had violated Mr. Meinhard' s 
constitutional rights by destroying evidence-not whether hairs were ever found 
in Mr. Peterson's hands. 
Specifically, after his conviction, Mr. Meinhard moved for a new trial and 
argued, among other things, that the State's loss of the hairs "violated [his] right 
to a fair trial." (C.R.669,677.) The district court rejected his constitutional 
argument, ruling that uthe evidence does not support the ... position that hair 
samples were lost or removed." (C.R.738.) On appeal, Mr. Meinhard again 
u assert[ed] that he was denied a fair trial" because of the lost evidence. State v. 
Meinhard, 2001 UT App 304U, *1. The court of appeals upheld the district court's 
ruling, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion. Id. 
Mr. Meinhard then filed a habeas petition in federal court, again arguing 
that "he was denied due process when the State lost or destroyed" the hairs. 
(R.271.) But the federal court rejected his argument after concluding that "the 
state trial court found no evidence was lost," and that Mr. Meinhard failed to 
meet his burden of showing that the state court's findings were incorrect. (R.271-
72.) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that u[n]o jurist of 
reason can disagree with the district court's conclusion that [Mr. Meinhard] 
failed to make a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right." 
Meinhard v. Friel, 118 F. App'x 392 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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But even if the district court had found that the hairs never existed, that 
finding would not preclude Mr. Meinhard from mentioning the contrary 
evidence. That finding-like the district court's finding of Mr. Meinhard's guilt-
would be susceptible to review in a post-conviction proceeding. Indeed, if the 
district court's findings were forever unchallengeable, the PCRA could not 
provide relief to a wrongfully convicted petitioner. 
At this stage, Mr. Meinhard has not challenged any of the district court's 
findings concerning the hairs. Instead, he seeks only DNA testing of the 
fingernail clippings. And because that testing has the potential to produce 
exculpatory evidence, he is entitled to it. 
C. The Fingerprint Can Produce Evidence that Will Exonerate 
Mr. Meinhard 
DNA on the fingerprint also has the potential to produce exculpatory 
evidence. As Mr. Meinhard pointed out, Mr. Peterson was killed inside his car, 
but his body was found outside his car and several miles away. (Op. Br. at 51.) 
This evidence suggests that the killer dragged Mr. Peterson's body out of the car, 
drove the car to the location where it was later found, and then returned later to 
bleach the inside of the car. Thus, it appears that the killer touched the door 
handle at least once, possibly leaving his DNA. (Id.) 
The State claims that and DNA on the fingerprint would be "meaningless" 
because "[i]t is at least as logical to conclude that the killer accidentally failed to 
wipe off an already-existing print as it is to conclude that he accidentally left his 
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own after cleaning the car." (Resp. Br. at 60.) Alternatively, the State 
hypothesizes that" the print could have been placed by an unwary hiker after the 
murder." (Id.) 
Indeed, it is possible that the print was left by someone other than the 
killer. But it is also possible that the print belongs to the killer. That possibility is 
why the State lifted and analyzed the print in 1997. Indeed, the State does not 
dispute that this was its goal in analyzing the fingerprint. Thus, DNA testing has 
the potential to lead to evidence that will exonerate Mr. Meinhard. The post-
conviction court's error was not harmless, and Mr. Meinhard satisfied his burden 
for DNA testing. 
Conclusion 
The district court misinterpreted the statutory requirement to obtain DNA 
testing. Under the correct interpretation, Mr. Meinhard is entitled to DNA 
testing. This court should reverse and remand for that testing. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 2014. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC 
Troy L. Boo::; ~~ 
Beth E. Kennedy 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ Appellant 
Jimmy Dean Meinhard 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIMMY DEAN MEINHARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION DNA 
TESTING 
Case No. 130900232 
Judge L. A. Dever 
Petitioner Jimmy Dean Meinhard (''Meinhard"), through his undersigned counsel of 
record, respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of his Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction DNA Testing. 
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SUMMARY 
On December 13, 2012, Meinhard filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction DNA 
Testing and a Memorandum in Support of the Petition. Under the Utah Post-Conviction DNA 
Testing statute (the "Statute,,), a Petitioner engages in a two-step process to establish factual 
innocence- first, the Petitioner requests DNA testing and then, if the DNA testing results are 
favorable to the Petitioner, he or she may file a subsequent motion to vacate the conviction. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-301 et seq. Importantly, in the first instance, the Petitioner must only 
assert factual innocence and show certain threshold criteria that would allow DNA testing. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-301(2). If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
Petitioner meets all of the threshold criteria, then DNA "shall be ordered." Id at §78B-9-
3 0 I (6)(b ). At the DNA testing stage, the Petitioner is not required to prove factual innocence. 
Rather, the Petitioner is only required to show that DNA testing is appropriate. Id 
In his Petition and supporting memorandum, Meinhard establishes, as required by the 
Statute, that he meets all of the criteria necessary to order DNA testing of biological evidence in 
his case. The State does not dispute that Meinhard meets six of the seven criteria. However, the 
State has requested that this Court deny Meinhard's Petition on the basis that such testing does 
not have the "potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that will establish [Meinhard' s] 
factual innocence." Id at §78B-9-301(2)(f). In objecting to testing, the State conflates the two 
steps of the Statute, attacks Meinhard's theory ofinnocence and argues that testing should be 
denied because it is not absolutely certain that the rest results will establish Meinhard' s factual 
innocence. In so arguing, the State misstates the relevant standard necessary to order testing. No 
petitioner could ever show, before the fact, that testing would produce certain evidence of 
I 
innocence. That is why the Statute only requires that testing have the "potential" to produce 
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evidence of innocence, which is clearly does here. The State's apparent belief that neither the 
absence of Meinhard's DNA, nor the presence of a third-party's DNA, has the potential to 
exonerate Meinhard is clearly incorrect and would render the entire post-conviction DNA testing 
statute meaningless. 
In addition, strikingly absent from the State's response is any explanation as to why 
testing the evidence at issue will hann the State in any way. The interests of justice are served by 
accuracy, not conviction. If the State believes that the test results do not warrant exonerating 
Meinhard, the place to make that argument is in the second step of the statutory process -- the 
proceeding to vacate the conviction based upon factual innocence, not at the threshold request 
for testing itself. At this stage, because there is the potential that Meinhard was wrongfully 
convicted and evidence that remains intact could shed light on that question, the interests of 
justice weigh overwhelmingly in favor of gathering more infonnation, not less. This benefits not 
only Meinhard, but also the State. Thus, Meinhard respectfully requests this Court to grant his 
Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
DNA TESTING NEED ONLY HA VE THE POTENTIAL TO PRODUCE NEW, 
NONCUMULATIVE EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE AND THE EVIDENCE 
l.V(EINHARD SEEKS TO HA VE TESTED HAS THAT POTENTIAL. 
The State devotes much of its response to reciting facts from the record pointing to 
Meinhard's guilt and attacking Meinhard's theory of innocence. The appropriate point at which 
the State should make these arguments is when, and it: Meinhard moves to vacate his conviction 
under §78B-9-303, not at the threshold where Meinhard is simply seeking DNA testing. 
To secure DNA testing, the Statute requires only that the Petitioner "assert'' his factual 
innocence and then prove the following criteria by a preponderance of the evidence: 
3 
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(a) evidence has been obtained regarding the person's case which is still in existence and 
is in a condition that allows DNA testing to be conducted; 
(b) the chain of custody is sufficient to establi~h that the evidence has not been altered in 
any material aspect; 
( c) the person identifies the speci fie evidence to be tested and states a theory of d_efense, 
not inconsistent with theories previously asserted at trial, that the requested DNA testing 
would support; 
(d) the evidence was not previously subjected to DNA testing or, if the evidence was 
tested previously, the evidence was not subjected to the testing that is now requested, and 
the new testing may resolve an issue not resolved by the prior testing; 
( e) the proposed DNA testing is generally accepted as valid in the scientific field or is 
otheiwise admissible under Utah law; 
(f) the evidence that is the subject of the request for testing has the potential to produce 
new, noncwnulative evidence that will establish the person's factual innocence; and 
(g) the person is aware ofthe consequences of filing the petition[.] 
I 
Utah Code Ann. §§78B-9-30 I (2)-(6)(b). In this case, the State does not dispute that Meinhard 
meets six of the seven criteria. However, the State claims that the test results do not have "the 
potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence that will establish factual innocence." Id. 
§78B-9-301(2)(:t). The State's insistence that the DNA testing results, and the results alone, 
must establish factual innocence takes that phrase out of context, is inconsistent with the process 
and evidentiary standards articulated in the Statute, and would require a level of certainty that no 
petitioner could ever meet. Indeed, under the State's interpretation, DNA resuhs could never 
establish innocence, because according to the State, neither the absence of the defendant's DNA 
not the presence of an unknown party's DNA is exonerating. If that were the case, the entire 
post-conviction testing process would be pointless, and no petition would ever be granted.1 
"'"[Where a literal reading of the plain language at issue 'creates an absurd, unreasonable or inoperable 
result, [courts] assume the legislature did not intend the result .... [and] endeavor to discover the 
underlying legisJative intent and interpret the statue accordingly."' Miller v. State, 2009 UT App. t 12 
(quoting State v. 'Jefferies, 2009 UT 57, ,r 8, 217 P.3d 265). 
4 
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The State's position also conflates two different proceedings under the Statute: a 
proceeding seeking DNA testing, and a separate proceeding, instituted by a motion to vacate the 
conviction, seeking a finding of factual innocence. See id. at§§ 78B-9-301 to 304. The standard 
for the first type of proceedi!}g is intentionally low, requiring only that testing have the mere 
"potential" to produce exculpatory evidence. Id at §§78B-9-301(2)(f); (6)(b) (requiring the 
"potential" to produce exculpatory evidence and evaluating the entire petition under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.) This low threshold is by design, because a petition for 
DNA testing simply seeks to gather potentially exonerating infonnation, not to conclusively 
establish factual innocence. See C.C. Horton, II, Utah's DNA Actual Innocence Bill, 14 Utah 
Bar J. 12 (2001) (stating that goal of the statute is to "give wide opportunity" for petitioner to 
seek exoneration). It is only if a petitioner later seeks to vacate his conviction based on the 
results of the DNA testing that he must satisfy the heightened standard of actually showing 
factual innocence by "clear and convincing" evidence. Id. at§ 78B-9-303(2). 
At this point, Meinhard is not seeking an adjudication of his factual innocence but only 
testing of biologicaJ evidence that has never been tested in this otherwise highly circumstantial 
case. Accordingly, he need onJy show that DNA testing has the "potential" to produce new 
noncumulative evidence showing his innocence. The State's assertion that subjecting both the 
fingerprint found on the victim's car and fingernail clippings from the victim to DNA testing 
does not have the potential to prove his innocence is incorrect. The State argues that the absence 
ofMeinhard's DNA on either the fingernail clippings from the victim or the fingerprint lifted 
from the car's door handle cannot prove Meinhard's innocence. However, Meinhard's theory of 
innocence - that he was not present during the murder - would be directly supported by the 
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absence of his DNA on both pieces of evidence, and would be further supported if a third party's 
DNA were present. 
a. Fingernail Clippings 
The State asserts that the circumstances of the murder "do not lo~ically require the 
killer's DNA to be under Peterson's fingernails." The State argues that despite testimony from 
its medical examiner that the victim had "defensive wounds" indicating a "violent struggle," 
there is no evidence that suggests the victim inflicted offensive wounds on the atta~ker. Trial Tr. 
Vo1. 4 at 14, 18. Given that the victim was trying to "ward off attack," it is high]y likely that in 
doing so, he came into direct contact with his assailant, possibly scratching him or her. Id. 
To support its argument that there is no reason why the assailant's DNA would be under 
the victim's fingernails, the State offers a list of assertions that are merely red herrings. First, the 
State argues that there was no b]ood splatter at the scene other than that from the victim. The 
State offers no explanation of why blood splatter would be expected to be found when someone 
is scratched, and it is certainly possible to scratch someone and not draw blood. The State argues 
that no evidence suggests the presence of foreign DNA under the victim's fingernails, although 
this can only be determined by DNA testing, which has never been done and which the State is 
now opposing. The State argues that there is evidence of trauma or dama$e to the victim's nails, 
but does not offer any explanation of why it would be expected to see signs of trauma to the 
victim's nails ifhe had scratched his killer. The State argues that no other person connected with 
the case had unexplained defensive wounds, but police did not interview Larry Taylor, a possible 
alternative suspect, until nearly a month after the murder, giving plenty of time for any defensive 
wounds to heal. The only way to know for certain whether thee assailant's DNA is in fact under 
the victim's fingernails is to test the fingernail clippings. Again, since Meinhard must only show 
I 
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that DNA has the potential to produce evidence of his innocence, he clearly meets the 
requirements under the Statute and the nails should be subjected to testing. 
b. Fingerprint 
The State argues that there is no proof that the fingerprint on the car handle bears any 
relation to the assailant. However, this argument is at odds with the State's treatment of the 
evidence when it was initially collected. At that time, the State subjected t~e fingerprint to 
forensic analysis, but there was insufficient detail to make a visual comparison. Clearly the State 
believed the print bore some relation to the assailant, otherwise testing it would have been 
pointless. The fact that the evidence suggests that the assailant returned to the scene and 
attempted to wipe away physical evidence and that there was one solitary fingerprint.on the door 
handle suggests that it was inadvertently left by the perp~trator. Because Meinhard need only 
show that there is potential for DNA testing to establish his innocence, the fingerprint should be 
tested. 
At a minimum, this testing, of both the fingerprint and the fingernail clippings, has the 
potential to produce new exculpatory evidence. What the evidence will conclusively prove, 
however, is not an issue at this stage of the post-conviction process. Accordingly the State's 
speculative assertions about guilt or how the evidence will or will not establish Meinhard's 
innocence are premature and provide no basis to deny Meinhard' s Petition seeking DNA testing. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the time of his arrest until today, Meinhard has consistently maintained his 
innocence. DNA testing has the potential to establish whether Meinhard, or some other person, 
committed this crime- at the very least, it has the potential to produce new non-cumulative 
- - ... 
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evidence of innocence. Because Meinhard meets this, and all of the other requiremeQts under the 
Statute, he respectfully requests that this Court order DNA testing of the evidence at issue. 
REsPECTRJLLY SUBMITTED this 25 th day of June, 2013. . 
sis Jensie L. Anderson 
Jensie L. Anderson 
Elizabeth Fasse 
ROCKY MOUNfAIN INNOCENCE CENTER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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This is to certify that on the 25th day of June, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Reply served e-filed and served by the U.S. Mail, and addressed to the following: 
Andrew Peterson 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P .0. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0180 
sis Jensie L. Anderson 
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56:28 - PRESIDENT: We will now go to Senate Bill number 172. 
56:32 - Senate Bill 172 Post-conviction DNA Testing, Senator Hillyard. 
56:40 - SENATOR HILLY ARD: Ms. President, (unintelligible) let me tell you, this is a 
very interesting bill. And if you've been following some of the history that's been 
happening in this area, I'm glad to say that this bill will adopt Utah into what's 
happening in the mainstream and even on the cutting edge of one of the issues I've 
got in this bill. It was actually brought to me by SW AP and the concern is this: 
someone has been convicted of a serious crime and is in prison and during this time 
of the conviction, usually a number of years ago, there were DNA samples, but the 
testing wasn't very specific. If you've been following DNA testing, you know it's 
become very, very specific now and there's a lot of things they can do on DNA 
testing that's getting better all the time at the identifying of people. So what's 
happening is people who, even on the death row, if you've heard of this case, I 
think it's the Wilkinson case, in Virginia, the man got within eight days of being 
executed for a murder that he maintained that he did not commit. And so there was 
a stay and in the process they did a DNA testing with the more sophisticated testing 
procedures they have now and were able to establish that he was not the person 
there. 
And so the problem we have is that we have no process to do that. So if 
2 
you're an inmate at the Utah State Prison convicted of one of these crimes and 
you've maintained that you are not guilty and now you want to have a testing 
mechanism, there's nothing in statute on how you really handle it. This bill puts in 
statute what will happen. A procedure that you have to file information, the 
information in the court where you were convicted, it goes to the prosecutor, the 
prosecutor then can give some response to it. You have to indicate that it is the type 
of case that you're not inconsistent; in other words, if you maintained you did the 
crime, but you were mentally ill, you would not be able to do this because you've 
already admitted you did it. 
We did put a thing in the bill that provides that if you plead guilty - now this 
sometimes happens, you sit down with someone and say you've been charged with 
first degree murder for which the death penalty could be imposed. If you want to 
plead guilty to a lesser offense and get rid of the death penalty threat, sometimes 
they do that. So that's taken into consideration, but if you've taken an inconsistent 
position-you say I did it but that wasn't the reason- now you come back and want 
a DNA test to prove you didn't do it, you can't do that. 
The victim also gets notice. They are involved if they want to be involved in 
the process. And then there's a procedure done whereby the DNA testing is done on 
the material. And you have to show that the DNA material was protected so it 
hasn't deteriorated. And if it comes back to show that you are not the person with 
that DNA, then it's scheduled for a hearing in front of the judge. It doesn't 
automatically exonerate you and, again, my first - when I read that I said, Gee, there 
3 
ought to be some sort of automatic exoneration, but I asked John Hill, who's 
director of the Legal Aid, and also Professor Frankel at the University of Utah, 
who's in charge of what's called the Rocky Mountain Innocence Project, which is 
heading this, they all felt very comfortable with this language - it' 11 go back to the 
court. 
The unique thing about this law for Utah is the judge, after a hearing, can 
come back and exonerate you and find that you, in fact, did not commit the crime. 
And so, there's some safeguards in this bill to make sure if you are in prison with 
nothing else to do you cannot just ask for this, there's got to be some sort of 
showing, some evidence. And if you end up that it doesn't exonerate you, you can 
be obligated to pay the cost of the DNA testing that's done. And if it comes back 
inconclusive, then you're not burdened with that as well. 
This is a bill that I feel very comfortable with, it has the input of SW AP, the 
prosecutors, the input of the attorneys who specialize in representing defendants. 
That I think this puts in place Utah, brings it up to date on the process, but also I 
think takes it one step further and exoneration, which I think is a good thing to give 
these people the rights that they need to have. 
You'll notice it also has the fiscal note on it, but it's interesting on the fiscal 
note, as they were talking about the fiscal note, if you do find inmates that are really 
not guilty - it's the interesting thing about being a prosecutor, their job is not only to 
convict, but to do justice. There's a special duty on a prosecutor when you do a 
prosecution, that if they know of exonerating evidence, that they give that to the 
4 
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defense because - and I was impressed when I dealt with the prosecutors dealing 
with this, they do not want wrongfully convicted people in prison either. And if a 
person, because of the state-of-the-art when the conviction occurred some time ago, 
was not given a full chance, can now come back and find scientific evidence that 
will exonerate them, then they ought to be given that. 
I'd be glad to respond to any questions you may have on the bill, but it's a very 
important bill. 
01:01:05 -PRESIDENT: Discussions or questions of Senate Bill 172 ... seeing none. 
01:01:12- SENATOR HILLYARD: Seeing none I call for question on the bill. 
01:01: 15 - President: Okay, we have question whether Senate Bill 172 should be passed 
for a second time. 
01:01:19-SENATOR HILLYARD: I should say though with emphasis on when you 
prioritize funding items, this is a bill that really needs to be funded. 
01:01 :30 - President: Okay, we have a motion before us that Senate Bill 172 shall be read 
for the third time. Roll call vote. 
(Whereupon a roll call vote was conducted) 
01:02:29 - President: Senate Bill 172, having received 26 aye votes, no nay votes, and 
three being absent, be referred to the third reading calendar. 
*** 
Day 36, Senate (February 19, 2001) 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?c1ip_id=8398&meta_id=51554 
24:26-MR. SECRETARY: Let's go the third reading calendar and we'll start with Senate 
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Bill number 172. 
READING CLERK: Senate Bill number 172 Post-conviction DNA Testing, 
24:35 - SENA TOR HILLY ARD: Thank you. This is the bill I explained on Friday. It 
involves DNA testing for someone who has been convicted of a crime and is now 
spending time in prison. And the science of DNA testing has so progressed to the 
point that you can go back and take that DNA sample and test it to see whether this 
really belongs to the person involved. It is happening in a number of states, I don't 
think one has happened here in Utah yet, but this actually puts in the statute the 
procedures to be followed. It gives protection to both the criminals and to society. 
This has been agreed to by both the prosecutors and the people in the Innocence 
Project, the Rocky Mountain Innocence Project. I would just remind everybody, it 
carries a fiscal note of about $56,000 so it's important not only you vote for it to get 
it passed here, but when we prioritize financial bills that it gets your support. 
25:21 - PRESIDENT: It has a fiscal note of 54? 
25:23 - SENATOR HILLY ARD: It has $56,000 fiscal I believe. 
25:25 - PRESIDENT: Fifty-six, okay. Very good. Any questions? 
25:29 - SENATOR HILLY ARD: And I would simply say, if we have someone on death 
row, who now this shows they didn't commit the crime, it will save a lot more than 
$56,000. 
25:36 - PRESIDENT: I'll say. 
Any other questions for Senator Hillyard? The question is shall Senate Bill 172 be 
passed. Roll call vote 
6 
(Whereupon a roll call vote was conducted): 
26:28 - PRESIDENT: Senate Bill 172 has received 27 aye votes, no nay votes, 2 being 
absent, passes and will be referred to the House for further action. 
Day 39, House (February 22, 2001) 
Web Link: 
*** 
http:/ /utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer. php ?clip_id=9736&meta_id=9967 
02:22:48 - READING CLERK: Senate Bill number 172, Post-conviction DNA Testing. 
Lyle Hillyard. 
02:22:56 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Representative Garn. 
02:22:59-REPRESENTATIVE GARN: Motion to circle Senate Bill 172. 
02:23:02 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Motion is we circle Senate Bill 172. Discussion 
of the Motion? Seeing none, all in favor say aye. Opposed say no. Motion passes, 
the bill will be circled. 
*** 
02:36:59 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Representative Swallow. 
02:37:00- REPRESENTATIVE SW ALLOW: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Motion to 
un-circle Senate Bill number 172, Post-conviction DNA Testing. 
02:37:04- SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Motion is that we un-circle Senate Bill 172, 
Post-conviction DNA Testing. Discussion on the motion? Seeing none, all in favor 
say aye. Opposed say no. Motion passes, 
Thank you, Senator Hillyard. We appreciate the extra vote Senator Hillyard. 
7 
Representative Swallow. 
02:37:28 -REPRESENTATIVE SW ALLOW: Thank you. I'd like to invite Senator 
Hillyard to present the bill as well as long as he's voting. 
This is an interesting bill, a good bill I should say, it codifies for the first time 
under Utah law that post-conviction DNA testing can be actually admitted into a 
court. Under our statute it provides a procedure for that. It provides for a petition 
post-conviction by the convicted felon, usually, provides for notice for all parties, 
including the district attorney. Provides that the court can actually have a hearing 
and actually exonerate someone if there's, under a clear and convincing standard, if 
there's evidence that would support the overturning of the conviction. It does have 
some qualifications. For example, if a defendant actually pleads guilty by reason of 
some other defense, for example insanity or something, they cannot apply for this. 
And in the event that the judge will not provide for the exoneration based on the 
evidence, the judge still can provide for a new trial. Now currently there is no law 
in place for the admissibility of DNA testing post-conviction, so I think this is good 
policy and I would urge your support. If you have any questions, I'd be happy to 
answer those. I do understand that this is a consensus bill between the defense bar 
and the prosecutors bar. 
02:38:52 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Thank you. 
Representative Bigelow 
02:38:58 - Representative Bigelow: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to make a motion. And 
I'm just trying to find the fiscal note on this is at $56,000. 
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02:39:05 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: I think it's self-appropriating. 
02:39:08-REPRESENTATIVE BIGELOW: And that's what I'm wondering because it 
showed 56,300 and we showed it at $56,000. 
02:39: 17 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: What's $300 among friends? 
02:39:20- REPRESENTATIVE BIGELOW: Well, then I thank you. 
02:39:23 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Further discussion? 
Seeing no further lights, Representative Goodfellow? 
02:39:30- REPRESENTATIVE GOODFELLOW: Would the sponsor yield to a question? 
02:39:32 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Mr. Swallow? Will you yield? 
02:39:33-REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW: I will. 
02:39:34- REPRESENTATIVE GOODFELLOW: I have a person that's been calling me 
about. .. apparently he's been paying child support for like ten years and finally took 
a DNA test to find out that in fact the child that he's been paying support for is not 
his and yet, they keep saying that he still has to pay. He's been paying for ten years 
and therefore there is no out, he has to keep paying even though the child isn't his. 
Would this bill cover a situation like this? 
02:40:05 - REPRESENTATIVE SW ALLOW: No, this is just deals with the criminal code, 
not with civil actions or civil matters. 
02:40: 17 - SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Further discussion? 
Seeing none, back to you, Representative Swallow, for summation. 
REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW: Waive summation. 
Speaker of the House: Summation is waived. Voting is open on Senate Bill 172. 
9 
Seeing all present having voted. Voting will be, voting will be closed. Senate 
Bill 172 having received 68 yes votes and zero no votes passes this body. Will be 
referred to the Senate for the signature of the President. The foregoing Senate Bill 
172 was publicly read by title, thereafter being signed by the Speaker of the House 
and the President of the House over which he presides. Act of the signing was duly 
entered upon the journal on this the 22nd day of February, in the year 2001. 
(End of requested transcription) 
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